Washington’s Phantom War The Effects of the U.S. Drone Program in Pakistan

By Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90 Iss. 4, Jul/Aug 2011

Drone strikes were successful in killing high-level leaders of the Taliban and al Qaeda. But few are. On average, only one out of every seven US drone attacks in Pakistan kills a militant leader. The majority of those killed in such strikes are not important insurgent commanders but rather low-level fighters, together with a small number of civilians. As the pace of the drone strikes has increased, so, too, has their accuracy. So far, the US has paid too little attention to how the strikes are seen in Pakistan. There are a number of steps Washington could take to make the drone strikes more palatable to Pakistanis concerned about civilian casualties and violations of their country’s sovereignty. To begin with, the US should make the program more of an operational partnership with Pakistan. Additionally, US and Pakistani officials should be more forthcoming about the program’s existence. A more transparent drone-strike program would increase accountability, in particular regarding civilian casualties.

INSIDE TALIBANISTAN

INSIDE TALIBANISTAN

FROM A DISTANCE, YOU MIGHT THINK THE TALIBAN IS A MONOLITHIC ENEMY. FAR FROM IT.

By Peter Bergen, Biran Fishman, and Katherine Tiedemann

After a summer ot souring reports on Ihe state of the war in Afghanistan, the “surge” of 30,000 additonal U.S. troops now in place. And not a moment to soon: U.S. President Barack Obama has already pledged to make a decision in July 2011 about how many trops bring home. So the window of time in which to contain or sufficiently weaken the taliban is rapidly closing. The problem is, the “Taliban” doesn’t really exist-or least, not in the way the term is normally used.

The original movement was a pakistan-supported militia built around a core of well-armed Afghan religious students (“Taliban” means “students” in Pashtun) that took power in the mid-1990s. But today the term has become meaningless, used to describe virtually any militant organization in Afghanistan and many in Pakistan-though they sometimes diverge widely in their allegiances, targets, and strategies.

Here’s a guide to understanding one’s enemies: not the Taliban, but the Talibans.

Obama’s Wars

Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2010

Defending the Arsenal

In an unstable Pakistan, can nuclear warheads be kept safe
By Seymour M. Hersh
New Yorker, 16/11/09

In the tumultuous days leading up to the Pakistan Army’s ground offensive in the tribal area of South Waziristan, which began on October 17th, the Pakistani Taliban attacked what should have been some of the country’s best-guarded targets. In the most brazen strike, ten gunmen penetrated the Army’s main headquarters, in Rawalpindi, instigating a twenty-two-hour standoff that left twenty-three dead and the military thoroughly embarrassed. The terrorists had been dressed in Army uniforms. There were also attacks on police installations in Peshawar and Lahore, and, once the offensive began, an Army general was shot dead by gunmen on motorcycles on the streets of Islamabad, the capital. The assassins clearly had advance knowledge of the general’s route, indicating that they had contacts and allies inside the security forces.

Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (5)

5. Conclusion: Expanded, Long-Term U.S. Commitment Needed

The security challenges of Pakistan’s tribal areas lie at the center of broader regional and global threats to stability. The best way to meet these challenges is through enhanced partnership with the political and security institutions of the Pakistani state, and the best way to improve this cooperation is by planning, organizing, and budgeting for a decades-long U.S. commitment to the region. Pakistan’s recent history of turbulence and the threat of another 9/11-type attack provide a political impetus for significantly expanded action by the next White House.

The precise scale-in dollar terms-of U.S. assistance in Pakistan is not addressed in this report because the next administration should first undertake its own review of Pakistan’s civilian and security requirements. This sort of review would represent a healthy corrective from recent practice. Washington’s commitments to Pakistan after 9/11-President Bush’s five-year $3 billion package and the recent five-year $750 million pledge for the FATA-were driven by political and diplomatic concerns, not prior U.S. needs-based assessments. That said, in the context of building a stronger bilateral partnership, the next administration must also bear in mind the symbolic and political significance of fulfilling prior commitments to Islamabad. This report therefore recommends that the Bush administration’s pledges of $600 million per year (half civilian, half military) should serve as a baseline for new commitments. Additional funding may be needed to support the short- and long-term goals outlined throughout this report, from strengthening governance to building security institutions that are capable of a full range of counterinsurgency and counterter ror missions.

Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (4)

4. A Long-Term, Phased Approach

Given the challenges and assumptions above, the United States should address the tribal areas through a phased approach, with immediate, short-term, and long-term components. These phases suggest a policy roadmap but are not strictly intended to prioritize resources since long-term projects will require up-front attention and funding, and urgent security threats may crop up over an extended timeframe.

A. Immediate: Manage The Most Urgent Security Crises In The Tribal Areas

For the United States, al-Qaeda is the single most urgent threat emanating from Pakistan’s tribal areas because it is the only group with the demonstrated desire and capacity to strike the U.S. homeland. Taliban leadership and foot soldiers engaged in organizing and conducting attacks on U.S. and ISAF/NATO forces in Afghanistan represent the second-most-immediate threat. Pakistani militants (such as TTP and TNSM) are an immediate but primarily indirect threat, since they offer safe haven and support to other dangerous groups while simultaneously undermining the stability of the Pakistani state.

Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (3)

3. A Comprehensive Strategy

A. Facing Up To The Immensity Of The Challenge

The years since 9/11 have validated the fact that the pacification of Pakistan’s tribal belt represents a necessary (if insufficient) condition for eliminating al-Qaeda, enabling reconstruction in Afghanistan, and maintaining domestic stability in Pakistan. But the immense scale and complexity of this challenge is currently underappreciated in both Washington and Islamabad.

The Pakistani government lacks the political, military, or bureaucratic capacity to fix the tribal areas on its own. Islamabad’s civilian political leaders have little recent experience in dealing with a development and security initiative of this scale; at present, they appear far more concerned with skirmishing over power than developing an effective policy for the tribal areas. The pathological imbalance between civilian and military power at the national level continues to hinder stable, efficient governance, and, particularly over the past eighteen months, has prov ided a formula mainly for lurching from crisis to crisis.

Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (2)

2. Background and Context

A. The Land And People Of Pakistan’s Tribal Belt

Harsh geography, poor education, and scarce infrastructure have tended to drive a wedge between Pakistan’s tribal belt and the rest of the nation.(2) With an estimated population of 3.5 million-out of a total Pakistani population of nearly 170 million-the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), at approximately 10,500 square miles, are roughly the same size as the state of Maryland and share nearly three hundred miles of border with Afghanistan. The entire
Pakistani-Afghan border runs 1,640 miles of difficult, widely differentiated terrain, from the southern deserts of Balochistan to the northern mountain peaks of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).

The FATA is the poorest, least developed part of Pakistan. Literacy is only 17 percent, compared to the national average of 40 percent; among women it is 3 percent, compared to the national average of 32 percent. Per capita income is roughly $250-half the national average of $500. Nearly 66 percent of households live beneath the poverty line. Only ten thousand workers now find employment in the FATA’s industrial sector. The FATA’s forbidding terrain further serves to isolate tribal communities from markets, health and education services, and many outside influences.

Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt (1)

Daniel Markey
Council on Foreign Relations
Special Report No. 36
August 2008

Contents

Foreword
Maps
Acronyms

1. Introduction and Summary of Recommendations

2. Background and Context
A. The Land And People Of Pakistan’s Tribal Belt
B. Governing Institutions
C. Security Forces
D. Musharraf’s “Comprehensive Approach” And Post-Election Deal-Making
E. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
F. Mapping The Threats In Pakistan’s Tribal Areas
G. U.S. Policy In The Tribal Areas

3. A Comprehensive Strategy
A. Facing Up To The Immensity Of The Challenge
B. General Assumptions And Implications For U.S. Policy

4. A Long-Term, Phased Approach
A. Immediate: Manage The Most Urgent Security Crises In The Tribal Areas
- Counterterror Strikes
- Military Offensives, Law and Order, Border Control, and Negotiations
- Strategic Communications Gap
B. Short Term: Bring Rapid, Tangible Political Reforms And Economic Opportunities To Win Allies In The Tribal Areas
- Redressing Grievances to Undercut Extremist Appeal: Law and Order
- Redressing Grievances to Undercut Extremist Appeal: Governance
- Empowering Moderate Tribal Leaders
- Employing Young Men
C. Medium-To Long-Term Security: Build A Sustainable Pakistani Counterterror And Counterinsurgency Capacity
- Building More Effective Security Forces
- Enhancing the Legitimacy of Force
- Building Bilateral Confidence
- Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination
D. Medium-To Long-Term Political/economic: Transform Pakistan’s Tribal Areas
- FATA Integration
- Building an Economy
- The Business of Development

5. Conclusion: Expanded, Long-Term U.S. Commitment Needed
The Least Worst Option

What Can the United States Do?

Any discussion of U.S. options in the circumstances discussed above must begin with a recognition that there are no alternatives to the policies currently being followed that are both good and radically different. Clearly, the st atus quo is becoming increasingly untenable. There is a growing conviction within the United St ates, in both the executive branch and Congress, that Pakistan must “do even more”(97) than it is currently doing. As Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns put it directly but politely, “we would like to see a more sustained and effective effort by the Pakistani government to defeat terrorist forces on its soil. Al Qaida remains a potent force inside Pakistan, as is the Taliban. Defeating these enemies is essential to our effort to defeat terrorism in South Asia and around the world.”(98)

Explaining Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Performance

The Afghan government’s dissatisfaction and now increasingly the American polity’s displeasure with Pakistan’s performance in counterterrorism operations are conditioned considerably by the perception of Pakistan’s unwillingness to crack down on terrorism comprehensively. This is a serious and, in actuality, complex charge.

Understanding Pakistan’s Approach to the War on Terror

Although Pakistan has been a frontline state in the war on terror since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, there is no doubt that General Musharraf initially cast his lot with the United States mainly as a result of deep fears about what U.S. enmity might imply for Pakistan’s long standing rivalry with India, its efforts at economic revival, its nuclear weapons program, and its equities in the con ict over Kashmir.(6) Desirous of protecting Islamabad’s interests in these areas and to avoid Pakist an becoming a target in the campaign against terrorism, Musharraf reluctantly cut loose Islamabad’s ties with the Taliban-a force it had nurtured, trained, and equipped for almost a decade in its effort to secure control over Afghanistan-and stood aside as the U.S.-led coalition assisted its detested antagonist, the Northern Alliance, to rout its own clients and their al-Qaeda accomplices and seize power in Kabul. Because the al-Qaeda elements in Afghanistan during the 1990s were never directly dependent on the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) for their success (despite maintaining a significant liaison relationship), the ejection of their Arab, African, and Central Asian mercenaries was viewed with fewer misgivings than the flight of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, who were tied to Pakistan directly in terms of both patronage and ethnicity.(7)

Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance

By Ashley J. Tellis
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. He was recently on assignment to the U.S. Department of State as senior advisor to the undersecretary of state for political affairs. Previously he was commissioned into the Foreign Service and served as senior advisor to the Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi and served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the President and senior director for strategic planning and southwest Asia. Prior to his government service, Tellis was senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and professor of policy analysis at the RAND Graduate School. He is the author of India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture (2001), and co-author of Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (2000). He is the Research Director of the Strategic Asia program at NBR and co-editor of Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political Change and Grand Strategy.

Contents

Introduction
Understanding Pakistan’s Approach to the War on Terror
Explaining Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Performance
What Can the United States Do?
Notes