The Regional Dimension: Jemaah Islamiyah


JI is an active jihadist terrorist group with purported historic links to al-Qaeda. The group currently enjoys a concerted presence in Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines and is known to have had established cells in Malaysia and Singapore. It has also tried to entrench an operational and logistical foothold in both southern Thailand and Cambodia. The United States designated JI a foreign terrorist organization in October 2002, shortly after the first Bali attacks (discussed later). The group was subsequently added to the United Nations’ (UN’s) list of proscribed entities, a move that requires all member states to freeze its assets, deny it access to funding, and prevent its cadres from entering or traveling through their territories (Manyin et al., 2004, p. 5).1

JI was established as a dedicated entity in January 1993, having been directly inspired by the militant breakaway wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt of the same name. The group itself formally came into being at Camp Saddah, the mujahidin training camp set up in Afghanistan by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a close confidant of Osama bin Laden. JI’s actual genesis, however, is far more historical in nature, tracing a heritage to DI—a movement driven by theological, ethno-political, and economic imperatives that was established by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo in the late 1940s. This latter organization was committed to the creation of a full-fedged Islamic state in Indonesia (the Negara Islam Indonesia) and consistently refused to recognize the legitimacy of the secular-oriented Indonesian state following the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch in December 1949. In pursuit of its objectives, DI launched a series of rebellions across Java, north Sumatra, and south Sulawesi during the 1950s that posed a direct and serious challenge to the ruling authority of the central government in Jakarta (Leifer, 1996, pp. 93–94; Abuza, 2005a, pp. 43 and 57, fn. 9; Schwarz, 1994, p. 169; ICG, 2005a, pp. 2–3).

Although the DI insurgency was efectively broken by 1962, the spirit of the group’s identity was never fully expunged, and its ideas continued to resonate among certain extremist Islamic elements throughout the country. In 1972, two DI adherents, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, set up Pesantren al-Mukmin, a boarding school based in Solo that was dedicated to the propagation of puritanical Islamist teachings. A year later, the facility relocated to the village of Ngruki and became known as Pondok Ngruki. Here, Bashir and Sungkar concentrated on building up small communities—jemaah— by working with even smaller study cells (known as usroh) of 8–15 members, each of whom swore an oath to separate themselves from all kafr institutions and follow a strict Salaf understanding of sharia law (ICG, 2002b, pp. 7–10; Suryhardy, 1982; Australian Government, 2004, pp. 43–44). It is in this context that the ICG observes,

It was a premise of the Darul Islam movement, later adopted by Abu Bakar Ba’aysir and his followers, that setting up a Jemaah Islamiyah was a necessary precursor to the establishment of an Islamic state. The various incarnations of Darul Islam saw the [creation] of small jemaah committed to living under Islamic law as an essential part of [this] overall strategy. (ICG, 2002b, p. 10)

During the mid-1970s, Bashir and Sungkar were drawn into open engagement with other radical Islamist elements through an elaborate sting operation concocted by President Soeharto’s intelligence czar, Ali Murtopo. Duped into believing that their followers were needed to help battle a reemergent communist threat, the two Muslim clerics were linked to an illegal group known as Kommando Jihad and arrested in 1978. Although they were released on appeal several years later, subsequent plans to rearrest them caused both to fee to Malaysia in 1985, where, along with an inner core of Ngruki alums, they acted as a critical “way station” for Indonesians and other Southeast Asian Muslims en route to participate in the anti-Soviet mujahidin campaign in Afghanistan. This experience had a profound impact on Bashir and Sungkar, particularly in terms of directing their ideological orientation toward a more explicit regionwide outlook. During this period, Sungkar and Bashir began to argue for the establishment of a puritanical Islamic state in Indonesia as a stepping-stone toward the institution of a wider, pan-border “super state” for all Muslims. They specifically envisaged a caliphate (Daulah Islamiyah) that would integrate the Muslim-majority states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, as well the southernmost areas of the Philippines and Thailand (Abuza, 2005a, p. 43; Manyin et al., 2004, p. 5; Singapore Ministry of Home Afairs, 2003, p. 6).

The collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998 proved to be a signifcant boon to the budding JI network. Formerly restricted Islamic groups from across the political spectrum were suddenly allowed to operate freely. Bashir and Sungkar returned to their country of origin with their Ngruki comrades and openly espoused their pan-regional designs. Just as importantly, the inability of Jakarta to retain control over Indonesia’s outer islands led to the eruption of major Christian-Muslim clashes that, by the end of the 1990s, had plunged Maluku (Ambon) and Sulawesi (Poso) into what amounted to a full-scale sectarian civil war. This outbreak of ethnoreligious violence provided JI with an ideal operational environment to recruit fghters, gain battle-field experience, and consolidate the organization in preparation for its self-defined campaign of jihadist violence that was to literally “explode” across the Southeast Asian geopolitical landscape after 2000 (Manyin et al., 2004, p. 6).


As noted, JI’s aims are essentially the same as those of DI but are shaped by a more explicit regional perspective and a stronger sense of jihadist ideology.2 The immediate goal is the Islamization of Indonesia, which is enshrined as a fundamental component of a broader ideological vision that views Daulah Islamiyah (an Islamic state) as the necessary catalyst for the restoration of Islamic governance across Southeast Asia (PUPJI, Chapter 5).

According to the group’s manifesto, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah (general guidelines for the struggle of JI, referred to as PUPJI and written in the 1990s), such an outcome can be achieved only via a two-step process: first, to develop a puritanical organization whose members have a strong sense of religious, social, political, and (most importantly) military identity, and second, to use this group as a platform from which to launch armed jihad (jihad musallah) against “infidels, polytheists, apostates, atheists, and the [morally] corrupt” in order to create a theocratic, pan-regional caliphate (PUPJI, pp. 3, 37–44, and 51–52).3

To expedite this process, PUPJI afirms the need to establish a solid base (qoi’dah sholabah) by creating a cadre of followers who are steadfast in their obedience and totally committed to the movement’s long-term objectives. It is these individuals—possessing the personal strengths of faith (quwwatul aqidah), brotherhood (quwwatul ukuwwah), and fortitude (quwwatul musallaha)—who are intended to act as the “core executor, propagator and guardian of the jama’ah’s mission” (PUPJI, p. 28; see also Gunaratna, Pavlova, and Hanif, 2004, pp. iv–vi).

While acknowledging the importance of education and preaching, PUPJI considers the use of military force as essential to the fulfill-ment of the movement’s strategic objectives. Refecting the teachings of Abdullah Azzam and other prominent militant Salaf ideologues, PUPJI sees preemptive violent action as obligatory for all Muslims under the aegis of an armed mujahidin (Barton, 2008).

This vision has been blurred in recent years by growing disunity among the movement’s ranks that has efectively split JI into two opposing factions: a pro-bombing group, which advocates “fast-tracking” the goal of a pan-regional Islamism by engaging in a sustained campaign of suicide bombings across Southeast Asia, and a more traditionalist bloc (known as the “bureaucrats”), which asserts that indiscriminate attacks are not sanctioned by PUPJI and that JI’s end state can be brought about only by returning to the movement’s DI roots and entrenching a more conservative religious order in Indonesia.4

Despite this rift, the general thrust of JI’s ideological approach can still be summed as one that is aimed at Islamizing Indonesia in the expectation that this will positively alter the religious balance in Southeast Asia and ultimately foster the creation of a wider caliphate. The adoption of force is commonly viewed as an integral means of successfully achieving this outcome.5 Although diferences of opinion exist over how quickly JI’s end state can be achieved, the long-term goal of instituting a cross-border caliphate, as well as the emphasis on appropriately developing the resources and capabilities of JI cadres to engage in concerted armed violence, is largely shared by the movement’s wider membership.

Structure and Size

JI has been described as al-Qaeda’s operational wing in Southeast Asia.6 However, this overstates the formality of the relationship between the two organizations. JI has developed as a distinct entity in its own right and, while it has certainly been prepared to accept al-Qaeda funding and technical expertise in the past, the group’s organizational structure is one that has been specifcally designed to further its own regional Islamist agenda.7

Initially, JI adopted a vertically integrated, networked character that was composed of several layers. At the helm of the structure was Sungkar, who acted as the preeminent emir of the movement. After he died in 1999, Bashir assumed exclusive responsibility for JI’s spiritual and ideological development, remaining in this position until he was arrested on charges of treason in October 2002.8 It is believed that the post subsequently passed, first, to Abu Rusdan and ustadz Adung and then Yusron Mahmudi Zarkas (aka Zarkasih), who were arrested in 2003, 2004, and 2007, respectively (Barton, 2008; Fitzpatrick, 2007; Jha, 2007).

Beneath the emir was a regional advisory council (majelis qiyadah) that was headed by a central command (qiyadah markaziyah) and chaired, until his arrest in 2003, by Riduan Isamuddin (aka Hambali). Next came three mid-level councils that oversaw matters pertaining to religious and disciplinary afairs. The group was made up of four regional divisions, or mantiqis, that were subdivided into smaller operational companies (khatibah), platoons (qirdas), and squads (fah) and
defned along both geographic and functional lines (Abuza, 2005a, p. 44; Manyin et al., 2004, p. 7; ICG, 2002b, pp. 27–28). The mantiqis were organized as follows:

  • Mantiqi I: Singapore, Malaysia (except Sabah), and southern Tailand; responsible for ensuring JI’s economic wherewithal
  • Mantiqi II: Indonesia (except Sulawesi and Kalimantan); responsible for leadership and recruitment
  • Mantiqi III: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the southern Philippines; responsible for training and weapon procurement
  • Mantiqi IV: Australia and Papua New Guinea; responsible for fund-raising (Singapore Ministry of Home Afairs, 2003, p. 10; Australian Government, 2004, p. 50; Barton, 2008; International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, undated).9

In practice, however, it appears that JI worked in a much less centralized fashion than this structure implies. As Manyin et al. (2004, p. 9) observe:

[The organization’s] goal of developing indigenous jihadis [necessarily] meant that JI members often had to work with and/or create local groups outside its control. [As a result], it is often diffcult to sort out the overlap among JI and other radical [entities]. Additionally, regional leaders appear to have had a fair amount of autonomy, and…many of the cells were compartmentalized from one another [for security purposes].

At its height in 1999–2000, JI was thought to have been able to count on a total membership of around 2,000 activists, plus a wider support pool of some 5,000 passive sympathizers who had graduated from the various Islamic boarding schools established under the group’s auspices (ICG, 2007b, p. 13). Tanks to a concerted crackdown on the movement by regional police and intelligence forces over the past seven years, however, possibly as many as 300 individuals have since been arrested or killed (Barton, 2008; Schmitt, 2008). Crucially, these “neutralizations” have extended to some of the movement’s most prominent and adept operational leaders and feld commanders (see Table 5.1).

High-Profle JI Neutralizations, 2001–2008

These losses have had a marked impact on JI’s institutional makeup, with the movement now existing as a far “fatter” and more segmented entity. Mantiqi I and Mantiqi IV have both been fully dismantled, and Mantiqi III appears to have been folded into Mantiqi II and reconfg-ured around a new leadership body, the markaz, which oversees four basic areas: religious training, education, logistics, and military operations. Tese areas are subdivided into region-specifc locales, known as ishobas, on the island of Java). In addition, there now appear to be just three distinct geographical commands for Indonesia—the west area, the east area, and Poso (Abuza, 2007d, pp. 2–3; ICG, 2007b, pp. 1–4; see also Jones, 2007, p. 23).10

That said, JI can still count on a cadre of at least 15 first-generation leaders who are at large (ICG, 2007b, p. 13; Abuza, 2007c, p. 2; Barton, 2008). It is these latter individuals who are thought to be at the forefront of the group’s pro-bombing faction and its focus on attacks directed against both Western and (perceived) secular enemies in Southeast Asia.11 Six in particular have attracted the attention of local and international law enforcement:

  1. Mohammad Noordin Top, a former accountant who allegedly acted as JI’s top recruiter and fnancier and in April 2005 claimed to be overseeing the operations of a hitherto unknown terrorist entity on the Malay archipelago known as the Tandzim Qoedatul Jihad Untuk Gugusan Kepulauan Melayu (al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago; see ICG, 2006, p. 14)12
  2. Joko Pitono (aka Dulmatin), an alleged protégé of Azari Husin and experienced electronics engineer
  3. Umar Patek, who is highly profcient in the manufacture of chemical-based explosives and who is wanted for his role in the 2005 Bali bombings
  4. Hari Kuncoro, Dulmatin’s brother-in-law
  5. Zulkif bin Hir (aka Marwan), who is presently thought to oversee all aspects of military ordnance for regional terrorist attacks
  6. Aris Sumarsono (aka Zulkarnaen, aka Daud), who allegedly acts as al-Qaeda’s current point-man in Southeast Asia and is thought to be commander of an “elite” JI squad (known as Laskar Khos) that helped carry out the 2002 Bali attack and the 2003 bombing of the JW Marriott.

Top and Zulkarnaen are believed to be hiding in Indonesia, while Dul-matin, Patek, Kuncoro, and bin Hir are all thought to be in the southern Philippines working with the ASG and, allegedly, renegade fronts of MILF.13

Operational Activities

As noted, JI exists as an unambiguously jihadist movement that is constructed along paramilitary lines and upholds the purported necessity (and religious legitimacy) of engaging in preemptive violence whenever tactically and strategically opportune (Barton, 2008). The group has, as a result, emphasized an active operational agenda that has involved political violence and terrorist attacks (planned and perpetrated) both within and beyond Indonesia.

Participation in Communal Violence in Maluku and Sulawesi

Much of JI’s initial operational activity was aimed at fanning anti-Christian violence in Maluku and Sulawesi. The group worked primarily with other non-LJ jihadist organizations created to defend Muslim interests in this part of the Indonesian archipelago—notably Laskar Jundallah, KM, AMIN, and Ring Banten—operating under the collective banner of Laskar Mujahidin (LM; literally, mujahidin militia). By July 1999, there may have been as many as 500 LM members on the ground in the central Maluku islands of Ceram, Saparua, Haruku, and Ambon. The bulk of these members were “deployed” for between six and 12 months and were organized into small groups of up to a dozen fighters who specialized in carrying out either precision or hit-and-run attacks against priests and Christian businessmen, community leaders, and churches. As the ICG notes, the range of weaponry available to these LM forces was considerable, extending from AK-47 assault rifes and antipersonnel mines to mortars, grenades, and Stinger 5s (ICG, 2002d, p. 19).

Many of those who became involved in violence in Maluku or Poso had no prior contact with JI or its partner organizations associated with LM. One of the key tools used to solicit these new members was propaganda video footage produced by Aris Mundandar, a Ngruki teacher and close aide of Abu Bakar Bashir. The exact method of inducting fighters varied according to the organization doing the recruiting and its location, but most inductees were first challenged to think about the sufering of their fellow co-religionists by being shown “documentaries” of the horrors of communal confict in Maluku and Sulawesi. Typically, the person approached would be a student at an Islamic high school; after being exposed to graphic images of Christian violence and cruelty, potential recruits would then be invited to join a halaqah, or study circle, to discuss the plight of Muslims in eastern Indonesia. If these individuals showed sufficient interest, they would then be introduced to the key precepts of Salaf Islamist doctrine before finally being taught the importance of jihad—not merely as a spiritual metaphor but also as an actual and necessarily physical means to confront those oppressing the Muslim faith. In JI/LM circles, this entire process could take up to several months, and even once subsequent physical and military training had commenced, as much as one-third of a recruit’s time was still spent in ongoing religious instruction (ICG, 2002d, pp. 19–20).

Early Terrorist Activity: 2000–2001

Apart from participating in communal fghting, JI also carried out three signifcant terrorist strikes between 2000 and 2001. The first, which was executed in August 2000, involved the bombing and attempted assassination of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia—allegedly as a “thank-you” for being allowed to access MILF training camps in Mindanao (see Chapter Tree).14 The second assault attributed to the group occurred on the night of December 24, 2000, when 38 churches were simultaneously targeted in 11 cities across the Indonesian archipela-go.15 Known as the Christmas Eve bombings, the combined operation involved US$47,000 worth of explosives (procured from the Philippines) and left 19 people dead and over 120 injured.

The final incident in this early spate of activity took place in August 2001, when the Atrium Mall in East Jakarta was bombed. Carried out by Taufik Abdul Halim (aka Dani), the attack was directed against a Christian group that met for church services on rented premises occupying the second foor of the Atrium complex (ICG, 2002d, p. 24).16 It later transpired that Taufik, who had fought with LM in Maluku, had been persuaded to carry out the attack by Abdul Aziz (aka Imam Samudra)—one of the main architects of the Bali October 2002 suicide strikes, which heralded the onset of JI’s most violent and destructive phase of terrorist violence.

Terrorist Activity: 2002–2005

As noted earlier, the most audacious and lethal strikes attributed to JI date from October 2002 (see Table 5.2). These operations, all of which demonstrated considerable skill in terms of bomb construction,17 pre-attack planning, and target surveillance, were justifed mostly under the twin umbrella of fghting the “far enemy” (the United States, its allies, and adherents to capitalist-led development) while fostering the supremacy of Islam across Southeast Asia. Although unquestionably spectacular, JI’s post-2002 activities generated considerable controversy within the movement. Not only did the bombings galvanize concerted CT action that led to the arrest of some 300 of the group’s members, many in the movement were highly uncomfortable with the large number of Muslim casualties that resulted from the blasts (something that was particularly true of the Marriott and Australian Embassy attacks in Jakarta). Strategically, the operations were also deemed counterproductive, not least because they directly contributed to increased pressure on Jakarta to crack down on JI’s main territorial base in Indonesia (see Chapter Eight).18

High-Profle Attacks Attributed to JI, 2002–2005

The net effect of these internal developments has been the fracturing of the organization into the aforementioned pro-bombing and traditionalist blocs, which has signifcantly reduced JI’s operational efectiveness. However, so long as the likes of Dulmatin, Patek, Marwan, Top, Zulkarnaen, and bin Hir remain at large, the possibility of large-scale, indiscriminate attacks and suicide bombings cannot be discounted.

JI Traction in Southeast Asia

As discussed in Chapter Tree, JI has gained a certain degree of traction among militants in the southern Philippines and continues to enjoy a residual presence in the region. According to AFP sources, there are probably around 30 JI members scattered across Mindanao, the bulk of whom are believed to be in areas under the control of ASG or renegade MILF commands. Notably, these include leading pro-bombing elements, such as Patek and Dulmatin.19 Beyond this, however, there does not seem to be any great afnity for JI even among extremists, and the ties that do exist seem to refect pragmatic self-interest and personal relationships rather than a passionate commitment to the idea of a pan-regional caliphate.

In southern Tailand, JI has little support, despite the increasingly violent and religious nature of the confict. Extant local and rebel outlooks remain parochial and very much focused on defending the region’s uniquely defined Malay Muslim identity.

Of the three critical states discussed in this monograph, Indonesia is undoubtedly the most vulnerable to JI’s message, in part because of the ideological links with DI, which provides JI with a ready-made conduit through which to communicate its Islamist propaganda. This historical connection also finds resonance in the raison d’être of other Indonesia-based Islamist groups, notably Laskar Jundullah, AMIN, KM, and Ring Banten. Although originally set up to fight in defense of co-religionists in Maluku and Sulawesi, all of these organizations systematically came to broaden their operational and political agendas in line with JI’s tripartite doctrine of imam (faith), jemaah (community), and jihad (holy war).20 As noted in Chapter Four, however, it is only Ring Banten that has demonstrated any real readiness to support designs that go beyond the Islamization of Indonesia to champion the idea of a pan-regional caliphate. To this extent, therefore, the true appeal of JI’s ideological message would seem limited, even among entities that advocate hard-line militant sentiments.

On a broader popular level, JI’s resonance is even less apparent. Tis refects attacks that have resulted in Muslim-heavy collateral damage as well as general apathy toward the idea of a wider Southeast Asian caliphate.

That said, one should not be overly sanguine about the complete absence of grassroots support for radical Islamic imperatives that JI could conceivably exploit for its own political purposes. In a 2007 survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat), for instance, a third of respondents (33.3 percent) said that they were active members of a religious organization. Slightly more than half (53.1 percent) agreed with the statement, “People who take liberties when interpreting the Qur’an should be jailed,” while 57.7 and 30 percent, respectively, indicated that they supported stoning to death and amputation as appropriate punishments for adulterers and convicted thieves (both of which are required by literalist interpretations of hudud ordinances as set out in sharia law) (PPIM, 2007, p. 12). When it came to their convictions about what Islam teaches with respect of the legitimate and proper use of violent means, nearly half of the respondents (49 percent) said that they agreed with the proposition that Muslims were obliged to wage war to protect their co-religionists from attacks and aggression perpetrated by non-Muslims. Just under one-third (32.8 percent) supported Islamist violence in Afghanistan and Iraq on this basis, and half of those retroactively justifed the 9/11 suicide strikes in New York on the grounds that the (subsequent) U.S.-led GWOT represented an onslaught against Islamic culture and beliefs. More disturbingly, one in fve (20.5 percent) of the respondents defended the Bali 2002 bombings as the legitimate destruction of a site of Western decadence, with a further 18.1 percent supporting the position that apostates and non-believers must be killed (PPIM, 2007, p. 10). Thus, a signifcant minority of Muslims can be expected to tacitly support the ideology, if not the actions, of groups like JI.

JI’s Future Prospects

Despite the many setbacks that have befallen JI in recent years, it is clear that the group still retains the capacity to articulate a compelling narrative to its support base. Even if the name Jemaah Islamiyah disappears from public view, like that of DI before it, the fundamentalist vision that the organization promotes and embodies is likely to live on in some shape or form and is unlikely to fade away completely. Most JI militants (both at large and in prison) will remain deeply linked to the group’s afliated Islamist networks, working through these embedded social relationships to quietly nurture and foster the jemaah cause

Traditionalists are likely to focus on rebuilding and consolidating rather than seeking to perpetrate large-scale attacks. Moreover, since peace agreements are now in place in both Maluku and Sulawesi (see Chapter Four), communal and political conditions are no longer conducive to promoting local anti-Christian jihad in eastern Indonesia. Given this situation, JI will probably reorient its attention toward promoting local dakwah initiatives. The principal aims will be to build pure Islamic communities as bases from which to prepare mujahidin for future battles and to fend of competition from outside Islamic groups, such as HTI (see, e.g., Jones, 2007, p. 22; Abuza, 2007c).

This consolidation phase is being supported by a new wave of jihadist publications and and sophisticated Web sites that are aimed at both the Jakarta youth market and middle-class audiences. The central message of these publications appears to be the promotion of an Islamic caliphate under strict sharia law.21 As a recent ICG report has acknowledged, JI’s current focus on the dissemination of information through a publication network is a direct efort to improve outreach and recruitment as a way of rebuilding the organization (ICG, 2008a, p. 14). It also provides an important source of terrorist fnancing through advertising revenue and the sale of videos and other materials.

The more radical pro-bombers, by contrast, will find it increasingly difcult to operate in any concerted manner—as a result of both unremitting CT action undertaken in the context of the continuing GWOT and popular rejection of indiscriminate tactics that negatively afect wider Muslim interests. However, the ability of these extremist elements to stage ad hoc, random bombings will be retained, especially as long as figures such as Dulmatin, Top, Patek and bin Hir remain at large. Most likely, they will choose attacks that are cheap, are easy to plan and manage, and can be readily executed by small cells (or even individuals) pulled together on short notice. Although largely illusory, such strikes would allow the pro-bombers to project an image of strength and create the impression of a formidable and highly capable organization.


  1. For more on the UN designation process, see Cronin, 2003.
  2. JI leaders have vastly different experiences and training compared to the DI commanders of the 1950s. Their time in Afghanistan and their links with mujahidin across the region and around the world have contributed to their understanding of and appreciation for global struggle. As a result, JI leaders have tended to be much more concerned than the founders of DI with striking out against both the near enemy, the national government (primarily the Indonesian government, but also the Philippine government, and, to the extent that it is possible, the governments of Singapore and Tailand), and the far enemy, Western powers.
  3. PUPJI outlines 10 main theological principles, four of which are particularly pertinent to JI’s ideological outlook: 4: return of the caliphate…, 5: faith, migration, and jihad…, 7: allegiance and nonallegiance…, 10: Islam in totality (comments made during the U.S. Pacifc Command Southeast Asia Violent Ideology Strategy Seminar, San Antonio, Tex., October 31-November 1, 2006).
  4. Comments made during the U.S. Pacifc Command Southeast Asia Violent Ideology Strategy Seminar, San Antonio, Tex., October 31-November 1, 2006.
  5. It should be noted that PUPJI afrms the necessity of giving prior warning to its enemies, who then have a choice to submit or die. The so-called JI bureaucrat mainstream argues that this negates the use of indiscriminate tactics of the sort employed by members of the pro-bombing faction (comments made during the U.S. Pacifc Command Southeast Asia Violent Ideology Strategy Seminar, San Antonio, Tex., October 31-November 1, 2006).
  6. For more on the extent of al-Qaeda’s reputed links with JI and other Islamist entities in Southeast Asia, see Abuza, 2003.
  7. Comments made during the workshop Al-Qa’ida, the Next Four Years: A Critical Look at the Group’s Status, Targeting, and Evolution, CENTRA Technology, Arlington Va., November 4, 2004.
  8. Bashir has never been tried with any ofenses specifcally relating to the actual perpetration of terrorist attacks. At the time of this writing, he had been convicted only of criminal conspiracy, for which he received a sentence of 30 months (subsequently commuted to 20 months as a result of time served). Bashir was released from prison in June 2006 (“Indonesia: Radical Cleric to Be Freed,” 2006).
  9. According to Barton (2008), Mantiqi IV was originally set up to recruit troops from Australia; after this failed, the prime purpose of the cell turned to fund-raising.
  10. JI also has a Central Sumatra wakala, which is based in the small city of Pakan Baru; however, the overall strength of this subdivision is not known.
  11. Author interviews, Singapore, April 2005; see also Jones, 2007, p. 24.
  12. Top has also variously referred to his group as as Anshar el-Muslimin and Toifah Muqotilah.
  13. Author interviews, Zamboanga, January 2008; see also ICG, 2008b, pp. 3-10; Jones, 2007, p. 25; and Rewards for Justice, undated.
  14. Two months later, JI was linked to a second attack, this time on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, which left 15 people dead. The case has never been fully uncovered, however, and the bombing is not now generally considered one of the group’s earlier operations.
  15. The targeted cities included Jakarta, Bekasi, Bandung, Sukabumi, Ciamis, and Mojok-erto in Java; Medan, Pematang, and Sinatar in Sumatra; and Mataram in Lombok.
  16. Initially, it was thought that the intended target of the bombing was Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had recently been sworn in as the new Indonesian president after the national parliament passed a vote of no confdence against Abdurrahman Wahid.
  17. The IEDs used in these attacks were typically in the order of >100 kilos and consisted of a mixture of ammonium nitrate, potassium chlorate, and diesel fuel, combined with a TNT booster charge (author interviews, Manila, January 2008).
  18. Author interviews, intelligence ofcials and security analysts, Singapore, 2005; Barton, 2008; ICG, 2007b, p. 1; Fealy, 2008, p. 391.
  19. Author interviews, Zamboanga, February 2008.
  20. As the ICG remarks, <blockquote>No understanding of jihadism in Indonesia is possible without understanding the Darul Islam (DI) movement and its eforts to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia….Over the last 55 years, that movement has produced splinters and ofshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent religious groups….It is what ties JI to every other ofshoot, including…AMIN, Ring Banten, [Laskar Jundullah, and KM]. (ICG, 2005a, pp. i, 31)</blockquote>
  21. Author interview, Adelaide, April 2008. Indicative of these publications is Jihadmagz, a magazine that caters to a relatively wealthy middle-class readership; covers conficts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya; and espouses radical anti-Western propaganda.

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