How Corruption Compromises World Peace and Stability? – 2

By Robert I. Rotberg

Nigeria and Other Corrupted Countries

The other case studies contained in this volume are equally brutal in their surveys of political and largely internal corruption in Papua New Guinea and Nigeria and in the six other country cases discussed by Rose-Ackerman and Koechlin and Sepúlveda Carmona. Papua New Guinea (PNG) is unlike Russia and largely devoid of transnational implications and trafficking, but Nigeria is implicated in a raft of transnational activity and is heavily involved in almost every form of cross-border and transcontinental illicit action, even the smuggling of children as slave labor.

There are few nation-states as corrupt and corrupted as Papua New Guinea. Dix and Pok suggest that corruption there is rampant and unchecked, with the state having been captured by criminalized forces. They also indicate that PNG is more infected than other places with systematic nepotism, costing millions of dollars in its separate provinces alone. Curiously, they report that in this unusual example of state corruption, petty (lubricating) corruption appears less widespread than national-level venal (administrative) corruption. It is also opportunistic rather than systemic, possibly because most PNG citizens are subsistence farmers with limited involvement in their government or with its officials.

All of these standard forms of corruption flourish in PNG despite accountability institutions such as an ombudsman, a fraud squad, a financial intelligence unit, a formal code of conduct for parliamentarians, an audit act and an auditor general, a proceeds of crime act, and a national anti-corruption alliance that coordinates inter-agency investigations and prosecutions. Dix and Pok discuss the weaknesses of each of these anti-corruption approaches within the PNG context, as well as the cavalier quality of the courts. Another reason for the inability of such well-meant mechanisms to stem corrupt practice in PNG, they write, is the pervasiveness of an indigenous culture of tolerance for corruption.

The people of PNG, like the people of so many other new nation-states, are accustomed to receiving cash in exchange for their votes, to paying off the police, to offering bribes to obtain telephone lines, and so on. But the six million people of PNG also appreciate that linguistic and ethnic kin need to work together in a network of reciprocity that is held together by corrupt practice, including the block buying of votes and large-scale nepotism.

Even so, the authors argue, Papua New Guineans are not always indifferent to the stain of corruption despite the overhang of social network obligations, especially if the offenders are from a different ethnic or linguistic group. The ombudsman does at least receive abundant complaints.

Western institutions lack legitimacy in PNG, especially when they are opposed by an elaborate system of exchange that has its roots in the culturally sustained practices of more than 800 distinct ethno-linguistic entities and innumerable cross-cutting kinship networks. These traditional practices have become a system by which politicians and officials view public office as opportunities to accumulate wealth and status for themselves and also for their networks-their wantoks. The spoils of office are expected to be shared, specifically through patronage.

Dix and Pok suggest that the spread of educational opportunity in PNG, a semi-literate country, may help break down the traditional support for cronyism and other incentives for corruption. So will a better educated population allow civil society, including church groups, to grow and become more active in opposing or at least questioning the ripeness of corruption in PNG.

The authors despair that Westernized institutional instruments may not be able to cope, no matter how strengthened, with corrupt demands that are enshrined in practice and now incorporated into the expectations of the “big men”-the political persons at the apex of PNG village, provincial, and national authority. However, it is to these “big men” that Dix and Pok look for possible ameliorations of corrupt practice. They think that a diminution of corruption in PNG will come only when “not so bad” leaders attempt to alter how their countrymen view the conjunction of tradition and corruption. When leaders begin to say that it is customary to be transparent and not underhanded, then the people of PNG may reduce their acceptance of prevailing approaches to corruption.

Nigeria also has its big men, its ethnic and kin networks, and its traditions of gift exchange, but Nigeria, compared to most other nation-states in Africa and to PNG, is well-educated and sophisticated. Corruption is common and expected in virtually all circumstances. As Smith’s chapter makes perfectly clear, Nigerians use corrupt methods to cope with the vicissitudes of daily life, assume that the web of corruption cannot easily be evaded, and still resent its exactions and rail regularly about how corrupt acts impose heavy costs on their everyday existence. Unlike the atmosphere in PNG, Nigerians have never condoned corruption or the heavy toll that it exacts on their lives.

Nigerians, reports Smith, “participate in forms of corruption that perpetuate their victimization.”19 They want to employ social networks of patronage, as in PNG, but ordinary Nigerians believe that elites have hijacked the patronage system to serve their own interests. Accountability mechanisms have also been perverted. The post-colonial state is the problem, because the dominant class plays by its own rules, not by society’s rules. It has captured the state and should share its resources more broadly than it does. Ordinary Nigerians bemoan what corruption does to them, but they still seek to participate in it to gain access to schooling, health care, and jobs. “Who gets to … a position of power and then refuses to help his people?”20 Big men must enrich themselves; they must fulfill the expectations of family and community.

At the same time as Nigerians understand the cultural underpinning of corrupt practice, they are aware that its level has far exceeded what can be explained by kinship, obligations of patronage, and responsibilities to home communities. They are disturbed by the crookedness of their fellow Nigerians-by scams and attempted scams. But they feel powerless to reduce corruption levels even as they seek to benefit from particular personal flows of clientelism.

Nigeria does not lack for official accountability organizations, several of which have worked effectively in the local battle against corruption. Nevertheless, on TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008, Nigeria ranked two-thirds of the way down, at 121 of 180. It also was among the bottom ten of forty-eight African countries in the 2008 Index of African Governance, to some extent because of its poor ratings on corruption, rule of law, security, and other critical categories of governmental performance.21

Suberu explains why and how Nigeria’s “unprecedented” official campaign against corruption since 1999 has essentially failed, its potential success being undermined time and again by acts of political commission or omission. Human Rights Watch, quoted by Suberu, suggests that much of the corruption and accompanying violence that permeates Nigeria is indeed criminal.22

The country’s principal perpetrators of corrupt practice are elite politicians at local, state, and national levels.

Although Suberu agrees with Smith that ordinary Nigerians are “active participants” in the social reproduction of corruption, the onus is on the ruling class. Indeed, Suberu says that the petty corruption that has long been endemic to Nigeria is “conspicuously trivial” compared to the “monumental” scale of corruption that is and has been for decades orchestrated by the nation’s rulers.23 According to the chairman of Nigeria’s Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC), two-thirds of Nigeria’s earnings from oil, about $500 billion, have been stolen by Nigerians from the nation’s treasury.24 Gift-giving, favoritism, nepotism, and most of the forms of corruption that are common everywhere, as in PNG, occur throughout Nigeria and constitute a culture of corruption. But corruption’s chief fuel in Nigeria’s modern times has been the massive wealth and abundant rents that flowed from petroleum and its export. Key members of the executive, legislators, state governors, judges, policemen, and even (or especially) military officers have all stolen outrageously. Between 1999 and 2007, thirty-one governors (Nigeria has thirty-six states) were indicted by anti-corruption agencies for embezzlement, money laundering, false declaration of assets, and illegal purchasing of properties outside of and inside Nigeria.

The country’s several anti-corruption agencies, and its penal code, have never been equal to the task of curbing corrupt practices. The provisions of the code have rarely been enforced and the agencies, no matter how active, have been unable to prevent the perversion of public office for private ends. Nor have public education campaigns and well-meant efforts led by military rulers in the 1980s. Instead, successive rulers of Nigeria have manipulated anti-corruption efforts and statutory agencies, removed key personnel who dared to close in upon miscreants who were high-level politicians at the national and state levels, starved the agencies of funding, and in many additional ways compromised even the boldest institutional efforts to curb corruption. Impunity also persists for executives and for Nigerians who were the big thieves in pre-1999 governments. The absence of clean elections further undercuts the credibility of national anti-corruption institutions and compromises their autonomy and their integrity.

Human Rights

Koechlin and Sepúlveda Carmona also dissect a national case-Malawi-but the primary argument of their chapter is that the prevalence of untrammeled corruption in the nation-states of the developing world seriously threatens human rights, as well as fairness and social justice, rule of law performance, and so on. Because the protection and empowerment of the globe’s most vulnerable and disadvantaged are core values of human rights norms, and because corruption helps directly and indirectly to immiserate the world’s already-poor and citizens of all income levels everywhere, the persistence of corrupt practices, as in the post-Soviet and other cases cited earlier, diminishes human rights. Furthermore, write Koechlin and Sepúlveda Carmona, major international conventions specify those specific human rights and impose obligations on nation-states. When human rights are undermined or attacked by corruption, those who are deprived of their rights are able to protest, or at least to draw attention to such often-ignored impacts of corruption. Linking corruption and human rights also should encourage increased public and official support for anti-corruption initiatives.

The claim that Koechlin and Sepúlveda Carmona make is often overlooked in the anti-corruption literature and in anti-corruption initiatives to boost accountability, such as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and TI’s National Integrity System (NIS). But the salience and potential power of an emphasis on human rights in battling corruption is strong, amplifying other efforts at enhancing accountability. Adding an awareness that corruption harms human rights could assist in the transformation of a culture of corruption into a culture of accountability-the goals of both the UNCAC and NIS. Koechlin and Sepúlveda Carmona urge anti-corruption reformers to understand and take advantage for the first time of the instrumental potential of a human rights-based approach in the battle against corruption.

In Malawi, Koechlin and Sepúlveda Carmona show that the nation-state has assumed a welter of human rights obligations by ratifying a number of international and regional covenants and conventions. Its constitution also enshrines human rights, creates a commission on human rights, installs an official ombudsman, and offers other bodies with broad mandates to protect and promote human rights. Malawi has also ratified the UNCAC, has enacted potent legislation against corruption, and has a strong Anti-Corruption Bureau, now bolstered by the report in 2009 of a forward-looking Anti-Corruption Commission authorized by the president and parliament and chaired by a well-respected former senior government official turned corporate leader.

Despite adherence to human rights and anti-corruption protocols, Malawi is ranked as a country that has hardly eliminated the taint of corrupt practice. In 2008, TI ranked Malawi 115 of 180 countries. That means that most citizens are still marginally enfranchised and subject to corrupt abuse that undercuts their economic and social rights. Where citizens fail to realize their full rights to life, to education, to health, and so on, and where that failure is in some measure attributable to corruption, Malawi is not fulfilling its treaty and constitutional obligations.

The authors’ argument is that in Malawi, as elsewhere, endemic corruption-the misappropriation of public funds and the misuse of positions of power-and a culture of executive and other impunity that perpetuates social, economic, and political inequalities together constitute human rights abuses. But this connection between corruption and human rights may be underappreciated locally. With recognition of the intimate linkages between the two, and an awareness of how Malawi’s progressive rules and intentions are being undercut by persistent corruption, it is at least plausible that the local anti-corruption crusade could be strengthened. Instead of treating human rights and corruption as parallel concerns, a common strategy in Malawi and elsewhere that combines the two would help. So would the employment of core economic, social, and cultural rights as a frame of reference to add a new dimension to and thus assist the struggle against corruption. Viewing corruption as a violation of human rights would emphasize its baleful impact on vulnerable citizens. Such a view would add a valuable normative dimension.

Battling Corruption

The last third of this volume sets out a strategy, admittedly mixed and mostly untested, capable of combating corruption. It combines best practices in the anti-corruption effort with novel and recently introduced initiatives. Every chapter in this section, indeed in the entire book, has something to say about how accountability overall and within particular jurisdictions can be strengthened. Accountability and transparency, after all, are the key antidotes to the perpetuation of corruption, but they can be achieved in myriad ways, some more plausibly effective than others. Together with strengthened measures of accountability, several of the chapters’ authors advocate swift and certain punishment for corrupt offenders. Zero tolerance for offenders is also proposed by some. But everyone involved in the great battle against corruption nationally and internationally knows how hard it is in most nation-states to target corrupters and corruptees, much less to punish them decisively. The struggle against corruption will be won, most of our authors agree, in the courts of public opinion and by giving backbone to national political wills. This last point was confirmed in 2009 by a public opinion survey in Kenya’s major cities: Three-quarters of respondents believed that the Kenyan government overwhelmingly lacked the political will to fight corruption. “Most of the institutions of governance,” said TI’s leader in Kenya, “had been captured by corrupt, narrow vested interests”-even the judiciary and the official anti-corruption commission.25

Corruption flourishes because rulers and ruling classes condone and, often, actively participate in its nefarious pursuits. My chapter in this volume argues that pro-active leadership by heads of state and heads of government can do more to reduce corrupt practices than almost anything else. This approach complements Heineman’s chapter on corporate responsibility. In both the political and the corporate spheres, we argue, leadership action is decisive. My chapter cannot conclusively demonstrate empirically that politicians, bureaucrats, and lower-level operatives solicit bribes and demand percentages of contracts because leaders (and their immediate superiors) turn the other way or seem (despite rhetoric to the contrary) to condone such actions by subordinates down the line. There is no certain way to prove that a culture of corruption, once unleashed, is responsible for examples of greed at the top or at the bottom of official lists. But we can argue from the few successful anti-corruption examples that committed leadership is essential if a polity seeks definitively to cleanse itself of corruption. A small number of political and corporate leaders with vision have done just that, not for moral but for profoundly instrumental reasons. In both arenas, prosperity, better living standards, and good earnings followed successful anti-corruption initiatives that were enunciated and then pursued systematically for decades until a reformed political culture (or corporate culture) had been achieved.

My chapter examines the very few successful anti-corruption cases in the developing world to show the critical inputs of leadership. But, once again, the successes are suggestive, rather than conclusive. No one has tested side-by-side two nation-states following different leadership trajectories. Correlations and circumstantial evidence support my contention, however, that human condition defaults toward corruption; only decisive and committed leadership action can intercede. Moreover, piety and moral appeals are meaningless. Heads must roll. Pronouncements must be followed by exemplary punishments, the higher the better. Moreover, the heads of state or of government must themselves be blameless, with no hints of embellishment or unfair perquisites. If not, their legitimacy will obviously be tainted and lower-ranking officials will take their cue from rumor or physical evidence of special advantage. The policeman on the beat watches what his captain does, and copies him or her. Ordinary police seek bribes if those to whom they report do so, and likewise on up the line. Cabinet ministers skim contracts because they can get away with it, but also because everyone else is doing it. Why should anyone miss out on the advantages of office, of position, of authority? In this manner corruption becomes a way of life in much of the developing world and in large swathes of the developed world, such as Russia and China. Only decisive political will-visionary leadership-can stanch corruption.

Heineman offers a prescription for the creation of effective internal corporate anti-corruption cultures that are infused with high integrity and high performance. He wants governments to mandate sustainable anti-corruption behavior by their corporate citizens. Since external corrupting pressures inevitably tempt multi-national corporate managers who must meet arbitrary financial goals, Heineman advocates clear and well-articulated rules that apply to all employees at all levels in all situations and countries under all circumstances. Not only should obvious infractions be sanctioned, such as bribe-giving and extortion-paying, but every manner of additional compromising payment, however clandestine, must also be outlawed. So must special arrangements with spouses or associates (or straws) of powerful recipient country leaders and for political contributions of all kinds. As Heineman writes, “a strong anti-corruption program requires a robust integrity culture,” together with unambiguous guidelines.26 But, as in the political sphere, corporate leaders must act decisively against miscreants and malefactors who cross the company integrity line. The leaders themselves must operate with integrity.

The best corporations, like the best polities, will educate and train their employees to avoid wittingly or unwittingly involvement in corrupt behavior. Heineman provides abundant examples of good practices, and shows how those practices can be applied across multi-national corporations. He emphasizes that “what is right” always trumps “what is legal.” Bribe-taking and -giving are not only corrupt and demoralize the internal culture of a corporation, but they also lead to actions such as the falsification of the books and dishonesty that eat away at the core of a modern multi-national enterprise.

Accountability in an anti-corrupt business is enhanced-as it is in the political realm-by giving employees “voice,” by empowering whistle-blowing (Lambsdorff is an advocate also), and by creating ombudsmen-like avenues for reporting potential infractions of the rules. Heineman further recommends compensating corporate leaders for performance with integrity, not just for performance. That rule has an obvious analogy for nation-states.

If multi-national corporations refuse to bribe, pay percentages of a construction contract to an influential minister, or give attractive gifts to the president’s wife or mistress, it may be possible for them to assist anti-corruption initiatives in selected developing countries and, also, to remove incessant temptation among officials accustomed to competing for emoluments with their envious colleagues. If, in line with Heineman’s idealistic prescription, multi-national corporations behave with a new integrity, at least one major corrupting influence will be removed and reform, strengthened. But Heine-man makes clear that a strong affirmative corporate culture depends, in important part, on robust enforcement of national laws against multi-nationals as required under the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. He also shows that the record of signatory nations to the convention has been, on balance, disappointing.

Lambsdorff offers a number of anti-corruption strategies for both governments and private firms. Investigating such measures statistically, he stresses the need for bottom-up endeavors, not only repressive punishments (which do not always deter) from the top. Likewise “zero-tolerance” sometimes produces perverse results. His research also shows that solid rules-based approaches alone do not raise a country’s ratings in the TI Corruption Perceptions Index. Even limits on individual office-holder discretion and overly restrictive procurement guidelines-even debarment-have their costs as well as their likely benefits.

Corruption sometimes flows from adverse incentives. This is the known consequence of artificial price or quantity restrictions, import quotas, and limited import and other licenses. A reverse policy, offering monetary and other inducements for non-corrupt behavior, is difficult to administer and produces perverse moral hazards. Moreover, as Lambsdorff reminds us, “honesty” incentives are unlikely to outbid the rewards that are provided by corrupters. Establishing an effective value system, as Heineman and others advocate, is obviously better, but is only capable of being developed if the actions of leaders and all of their followers strengthen their legitimacy. Mere compliance systems are insufficient. However, leniency for self-reporting that leads to effective prosecution does have its benefits. Such a policy provides incentives for corrupt parties to report each other. Indeed, Lambsdorff wants corrupt actors to be “seduced to betray each other so as to destabilize corrupt transactions.”27

Grassroots initiatives by civil society are what Lambsdorff calls a core contributor to anti-corruption efforts. Press freedom is another bottom-up contribution to the effort; countries with high levels of press freedom have lower levels of perceived corruption. Leniency and self-reporting are also bottom-up strategies. Overall, bottom-up efforts need to “highlight the economic returns from acting with integrity.” Relying on morality will not do.28

When Eigen created TI in 1993, he little knew how successful his efforts would be in energizing the battle against corruption. As a World Bank official with extensive experience in Africa, he understood well how the rot of corruption had undermined the bank’s well-intended efforts to contribute to Africa’s economic growth and development. That was among his motives in establishing a new NGO that would build coalitions in many developing countries (now more than 100) to combat the spread of corruption. (His chapter devotes a few modest paragraphs to the founding of TI.) As a by-product came the now well-regarded and carefully researched survey of surveys-TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (developed by Lambsdorff)-and the more recent Bribe Payer’s Index. Later, Eigen and TI invented Integrity Pacts for governments and all bidders for public contracts. These instruments constituted pledges not to solicit or pay bribes, with accompanying monitoring systems.

Eigen almost singlehandedly brought corruption out of the closet and compelled the bank, other donors, and governments everywhere to acknowledge the existence and the corrosive scale of corruption. Corruption, Eigen and TI emphasized, was a systematic and recognized way to undertake business by most European multi-national corporations. It was also tax deductible, legal, and condoned. (The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 had uniquely prohibited the bribing of foreign officials.)29 The modern concern with and assault on corruption begins with Eigen and the founding of TI. The 1999 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) are direct outcomes of Eigen’s efforts. (There were 140 ratifications by nation-states of UNCAC through 2008, although what such ratifications actually imply about implementation is problematical.)

Now, as Eigen’s chapter in our book indicates, he is active in bolstering the capacity of civil society to battle corruption. He also believes that anti-corruption efforts may be strengthened by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Originated by a coalition of NGOs calling themselves Publish What You Pay, EITI encourages its corporate and governmental signatories to declare their payments openly, i.e., to declare how much ExxonMobil is paying Cameroon in annual petroleum royalties, for example.

EITI monitors data on financial flows to see that extractive industries are reporting what is paid to governments and that governments are allowing companies to do so. Thirty-seven oil, gas, and mining companies have endorsed EITI. Resource-rich countries first become candidate countries (twenty-three in 2009). After independent validations, they can become compliant countries. EITI intends to become the gold standard for revenue transparency for extractive industries. It may also expand soon into the timber exporting sector.

In another sectoral diagnosis, Griffin offers a set of prescriptions capable of reducing corruption in the health and educational arenas of developing countries. On average, in such nation-states, health and education budgets account for more than half of central government expenditures. Foreign assistance is often concentrated on the enlargement of health capacities and on educational improvements in low- and middle-income countries, but to what effect? Since many of these countries are perceived as thoroughly corrupt, according to TI, and since accountability and fiduciary controls are often lamentably weak, many of the funds supposedly devoted to strengthening health and education in the developing world are wasted.

Griffin goes beyond standard definitions of corruption to include blatant absenteeism or the failure to deliver appropriate (and expected) services under the usual rubric of abusing public office for private gain. He also discusses ghost workers, the abuse of shady procurement systems, collusion among bidders, inadequate tracking mechanisms that facilitate peculation, falsified claims, and a host of other scams that either adulterate or jeopardize health outcomes and reduce educational opportunity in needy countries.

One method of combating these common deficiencies is to design new educational and health programs that empower citizens, not bureaucracies, and shift performance risks from government to private suppliers. Griffin wants to make teachers in schools responsible to students, hospital administrators and physicians to their patients. In El Salvador (and in Bangladesh and New Zealand), school management is decentralized, with parent-teacher associations in charge of overseeing central government disbursements and instructional outcomes. The health market is much more difficult to strengthen in analogous ways, but subsidized insurance that follows individual patients (as in China, Ghana, Kenya, and many other countries) helps. Principals, in other words, should be in charge of agents, not the other way around. By such means can greater accountability and transparency be achieved, and corruption reduced markedly.

Jomo urges those who battle corruption to avoid laundry lists of governance reforms. It is impossible, he writes, to address all kinds of corruption simultaneously. He suggests that anti-corruption efforts should focus on those types of corruption that are most damaging to development. In many circumstances, economic growth is a necessary condition for effectively addressing corruption. He argues that ostensible governance-enhancing reforms such as decentralization may unintentionally create new opportunities for rent-seeking. Even privatization, which is seemingly intended as a policy intervention to reduce public sector corruption, unwittingly creates new opportunities. Condemning all rent-seeking also obscures the many ways in which rent-seeking in the developing world may be regulated appropriately and channeled for development. Furthermore, encouraging profit maximization and the seeking of competitive advantage is to be encouraged, not always deprecated.

Together, the contributors to this expanded approach to the age-old problems of corruption agree-even without being able to quantify their accord-that corruption in the twenty-first century infects much more of human activity than ever before. Globalization in all of its ramifications has made it much easier than in previous centuries to propagate corrupt pursuits, and for corrupt officials to facilitate all manner of transnational and transcontinental forms of crime. Indeed, absent corrupt channels, the world would be more secure, less anxious about the spread of WMD and terror, and less affected by illicit trafficking of myriad kinds.

The authors each propose remedies: enhanced transparency and heightened awareness by media investigators and civil society; an aroused public opinion; tougher and more certain punishment; decisive anti-corrupt leaders who set a positive example personally and politically; adherence to internationally set standards and new initiatives like EITI and the OECD convention; and new, enforceable sanctions against money laundering, trafficking, and innumerable kinds of shady activities. No singular attack on corruption will reduce its spread and pernicious importance. But a combination might, especially if all of the remedies and responses offered throughout this book are deployed strategically to overwhelm the global practice and threat of corruption.


  1. Ari Adut, On Scandal: Moral Disturbances in Society, Politics, and Art (New York, 2008), 129-174.
  2. George Eliot, Felix Holt, The Radical (New York, Crowell edition, nd, but circa 1870; orig. pub. London, 1866); Charles Dickens, Little Dorrit (London, 1855). This novel, by Dickens, was first published as a serial novel between 1855 and 1857. Although decried by many nineteenth-century critics, it is now praised as a tale that disparages modern social and political corruption.
  3. Joseph S. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” American Political Science Review, LXI (1967), 417-427. For additional definitions and ways of understanding the different definitions, see Peter John Perry, Political Corruption and Political Geography (Brookfield, VT, 1997), 12-18.
  4. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, 1972), 67.
  5. Transparency International-Kenya, “Kenya Bribery Index 2008” (Nairobi, 2008), available at http://www.tikenya.org/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf (accessed 18 February 2009).
  6. For Singapore, see Robert I. Rotberg, “Leadership Alters Behavior,” chapter 13 in this volume. Susan Rose-Ackerman says in her chapter that “strong leadership and good morals are not sufficient.” See Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption in the Wake of Domestic National Conflict,” 86.
  7. Laura Underkuffler, “Defining Corruption: Implications for Africa,” 30.
  8. Ibid., 31.
  9. Ibid., 38.
  10. World Bank Institute, “Worldwide Governance Indicators: 1996-2006” (Washington, D.C., 2007), available at http://www.govindicators.org (accessed 18 February 2009).
  11. Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption in the Wake,” 86.
  12. Ibid.
  13. Kelly Greenhill, “Kleptocratic Interdependence: Trafficking, Corruption, and the Marriage of Politics and Illicit Profits,” 99.
  14. Ibid., 103.
  15. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Corruption Undercuts U. S. Hopes for Improving the Afghan Police,”New York Times (9 April 2009).
  16. Robert Legvold, “Corruption, the Criminalized State, and Post-Soviet Transitions,” 196.
  17. Ibid., 201.
  18. Ibid., 229.
  19. Daniel Jordan Smith, “The Paradoxes of Popular Participation in Corruption in Nigeria,” 286.
  20. Ibid., 297.
  21. Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index” (2008), available at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 (accessed 18 February 2009); Robert I. Rotberg and Rachel M. Gisselquist, Strengthening African Governance: Ibrahim Index of Governance, Results and Rankings 2008 (Cambridge, MA, 2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/52/intrastate_conflict_ program.html?page_id=224 (accessed 18 February 2009).
  22. Rotimi Suberu, “The Travails of Nigeria’s Anti-Corruption Crusade,” 260.
  23. Ibid., 261.
  24. Ibid., 264.
  25. Derek Kilner, “Watchdog Says Graft Could Cause More Election Violence in Kenya,” Voice of America Online (9 March 2009), available at http://www.voanews.com (accessed 14 April 2009). Job Ogonda is the TI leader quoted.
  26. Ben W Heineman, Jr., “The Role of the Multi-National Corporation in the Long War against Corruption,” 362.
  27. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “The Organization of Anti-Corruption: Getting Incentives Right,” 409.
  28. Ibid., 410.
  29. Lambsdorff’s chapter is critical of the full effectiveness of this act.

Republished by Kajian Internasional Strategis

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